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Introduction 
 Over the last decade, scholars of European politics have increasingly analysed the 
concept of ‘Europeanisation’. Their focus has been on the Europeanisation processes of 
EU public policies (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Börzel, 1999; Tallberg, 2002; 
Radaelli, 1997) and of party structures within the European political space such as party 
groups in the European Parliament (EP) and their policy positions (Gabel and Hix, 2002; 
Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1996). Despite the strengths of these works, absent in the 
literature is a cogent analysis considering the ‘Europeanisation of national political 
parties’. National policy-making actors and institutions such as political parties are left 
unconsidered and unexplored (Ladrech, 2002), and have not fully been analysed as active 
actors in European integration, neglecting the possibility that the EU is also structuring 
parties’ national political space. Furthermore, they also fail to examine how national 
parties are affected by, and adapt to, supranational level developments. 
 Seeking to transcend these insufficiencies in the literature, this study aims to 
provide a deeper understanding of national political parties in the integration process and 
to offer a substantial contribution to the Europeanisation debate by fully incorporating 
analysis of the role of political parties. The aim is to combine the two major strands in the 
recent literature and, thus, to examine the Europeanisation processes in an institutional 
environment situated at the national level. The broad understanding of Europeanisation to 
be developed, which we argue extends upon the top-down approach in the existing 
Europeanisation literature, is that political parties are increasingly extending the 
boundaries of the relevant political space beyond the national level (Kohler-Koch, 1999) 
while, simultaneously, incorporating the European dimension in their domestic discourse 
and structures (Radaelli, 2000) allocating more importance to it. In other words, our 
definition of Europeanisation entails both a positional dimension, which reflects the 
parties’ position towards Europe, and a salience dimension, which reflects the importance 
that parties’ attribute towards integration. By our definition, then, if Europeanisation of 
political parties is fully occurring, one would expect that Europe leads both to a change in 
parties’ EU-positions and to an increase of parties’ EU-salience.  
 The data analysed consists of Italian parties’ manifestos for national and European 
elections. We analyse the manifestos from 1979 to 1999 with the ‘Wordscore’-programme 
(Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003) in order to gauge whether or not Europeanisation of 
salience and the national political space has occurred.  
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 This article has three sections. The first reviews in more depth the theoretical 
debates on Europeanisation of political parties and shows where our study is embedded. 
This section also details the objectives of this study and illustrates the peculiarities of 
Italian political parties and their commonly assumed positions towards Europe. The 
second section introduces the method of analysis and deals with the research design. The 
third discusses the study’s results, highlighting its contribution towards the 
Europeanisation debate. 
 
Political Parties and European Integration 
A theoretical overview 
Our study is situated in the two main theoretical debates that analyse party 
developments in context of the EU. The first downplays the importance of dynamics 
between integration and parties, while the other points to, although it does not fully 
develop or compellingly demonstrate, its significance.  
The first, clearly pre-dominant, view undermines the importance of 
Europeanisation and national parties, arguing that parties are not influenced by EU-level 
developments. This literature has been concerned exclusively on EP election dynamics, 
approximating only descriptive analysis that is not comparative in its examination. For 
example, examining electoral campaigns for EP elections over twenty-five years, some 
argue that national issues are dominant: in order to obtain citizens’ votes and modify 
favourably the domestic political situation, parties give privilege to national themes over 
topics of general European interest, resulting in EP elections being labelled as ‘second-
order elections’ (Hix and Lord, 1997; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; Reif, 
1997). Although citizens decide on the composition of the EP and therefore European 
legislation, national issues are thought to determine election winners and losers. 
Moreover, parties are thought to interpret election results according to the national 
political situation.  
The second view, in contrast to the first predominant one, contends that European 
parties have responded to the impact of integration, ultimately influencing the direction of 
the European integration process (Ladrech, 2002). EU policies are increasingly affecting 
domestic policy-making agenda setting, and a European identity is slowly developing 
among some European citizens. As such, it would not seem unreasonable to hypothesize 
that political parties are also becoming increasingly Europeanised: parties may have 
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slowly changed and utilised the EP elections to state their stance on Europe, to put forth 
their goals for Europe-wide policies, and therefore to omit or at least draw less reference 
to the debate of national issues. A different economic environment, a more intense 
competition for votes and party cohesion may be the explanatory factors for such changes 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994; Müller, 1997; Kitschelt, 1999), but it could also be argued that a 
European party system, together with a European electorate, are slowly emerging with 
parties that are adapting (Andeweg, 1995; Mair, 1999). Hence, the dynamics between 
integration and national parties have to be re-evaluated. As a consequence of integration, 
parties change and adapt to a newly developing political landscape (Ladrech, 2002), even 
to the point where Europeanisation has resulted in the ideological ‘mellowing out’ and 
increasing ‘professionalisation’ of some parties’ politics as seen in European Green parties 
(Bomberg, 2002). However, a main insufficiency in the literature remains because there is 
not one study that satisfactorily deals with political parties as actors in this process.  
 
Objectives of the Study 
Seeking to better understand how parties are affected by the European integration 
process, and how they adapt to this new political situation, this study is situated in the 
context of a Europeanisation process of national political systems as a whole and aims to 
measure the changes derived from European integration with respect to parties. The 
paper’s specific objectives are three-fold.   
First, through analysis of developments in Italy, we examine whether or not 
political parties deem the European topic as more important for their party politics. 
Noteworthy here is the salience of ‘Europe’ and whether or not European issues are 
incorporated more dominantly into party discourses over time. If Europeanisation 
occurred, one would see a change in the dimensionality of the national political space 
precisely because the added European dimension gains importance. Hence, we assume 
that this new dimension has an impact on the parties’ perceptions of Europe, which leads 
to the observation of a Europeanisation process in terms of higher European salience.  
Based on findings relating to this first objective, the second objective is to 
contribute to the ‘second-order-election’ debate. As aforementioned, EP-elections are 
considered of secondary importance as they do not focus on European issues, policies, 
institutions and political parties but, rather, are contests on national governments’ 
performance. However, one may hypothesize that EP-elections have gained in importance 
since 1979, being reflected also in parties’ manifestos. Thus, the more the salience 
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‘Europe’, the more reflective this would be of the idea that EP-elections have moved from 
second- to first-order elections.1   
A third related objective is to examine party positions towards European 
integration per se, analysing whether or not changes in policy positions have occurred 
based on the Europeanisation process. This objective is therefore not a descriptive outline 
regarding parties’ stances regarding European integration, but, rather, an analysis of the 
degree of influence that participation in EU processes has on their policy positions 
expressed at the national and European levels. Actors locate themselves differently in the 
political space because the multi-dimensionality of both national and European space has 
to be taken into consideration. The dimensionality of a political space includes several 
dimensions, which constrain the policy position of political actors (Gabel and Hix, 2002). 
Thus, as the European dimension becomes more dominant in the national space through 
discourses and actions, it is assumed that parties are now paying increasing attention to 
their policy position towards Europe. This could result in a revision of their previously 
superficially articulated stances on European policy, arguably the result of low voting 
benefits. The direction of policy positions may have changed or may have absorbed a 
European dimension because of the increasing relevance of the European integration 
process. Variations within parties and amongst parties regarding their policy positions 
towards Europe will thus be analysed carefully. One may argue that the European 
‘dimension’, in particular, not only shapes party positions, but also represents ‘constraints’ 
on the policy position of political actors, potentially forcing parties to change platforms. 
The idea here is that party positions can be broadened due to the introduction of a new 
European dimension where parties not only have to locate themselves, but also 
differentiate themselves from others. 
 
Italian Parties and Europe 
 The literature accepts that Italy, as one of the founding members of the 
Community, has traditionally been a strong supporter of closer union. Furthermore, 
opinion poll data indicates that there is widespread support among Italian citizens for the 
EC/EU. However, closer scrutiny reveals the impreciseness of this view. Rather, there is 
considerable evidence suggesting that parties have held quite dynamic views towards a 
united Europe. This section briefly examines the major parties stances on EU integration. 
This overview also seeks to serve as a basis to evaluate the results obtained in our later 
analysis and better determine whether experts’ estimates on party positions are valid.  
 6 
 Examining active Italian political parties that can trace their roots to those 
belonging to the First Republic, one sees that current positions towards the EU may 
actually not reflect stances taken in the past. There is the perception that left leaning 
parties today are more pro-European than their conservative counterparts. However, the 
very positive attitude of the left towards the EU is by no means all encompassing nor has a 
solid history. The heirs of the old PCI are a primary example of this.  
Far from being enthusiastic about the European project, the Communist party held 
negative views when the integration process started. This rather sceptical attitude was due 
to both the international context and ideology. European integration was seen by the PCI 
as another move towards locking Italy into the West to the detriment of an autonomous 
and possibly changeable position. Like membership to NATO, EU membership meant 
further obstacles regarding a rapprochement to the Soviet Union. This attitude changed in 
the late 1960s and by the 1970s the party started to move in the opposite direction, 
although it opposed acts aimed at solidifying the Union such as the European Monetary 
System and the Single European Act. Despite this negative posture, EU membership per 
se, just like acceptance of Italy’s membership to NATO, no longer posed a problem to the 
PCI even if in disagreement with the Community’s economic policies. Rather, the PCI 
saw in Europe an opportunity to strengthen its domestic and international profile. The 
heirs of the PCI are perceived to hold opposing views to the EU, with the DS being strong 
supporters and Rifondazione Comunista (RC) being antagonistic to it. It should be 
underlined, however, that RC basis its opposition on the neo-liberal economic model of 
development and not on a nationalistic platform (Salvadori, 1999).  
 Unlike the PCI, the Christian Democrats have always supported the EC/EU. 
Further, international constraints were a major factor in DC’s supporting the integration 
process. EU Membership was seen as a step towards locking Italy into a multilateral and 
Western based institution, providing a complementary economic ‘lock’ to the ‘military’ 
one offered by NATO. This tradition of Community support continued until the final days 
of DC and the heirs of that tradition are probably the most pro-European actors within the 
two coalitions. It is probably no surprise that a ‘member’ of the Italian Christian 
Democratic family is today the Head of the EU Commission.  
 Consistency in attitudes, albeit with moderate changes, is also a trait of the right 
wing party Italian Social Movement – National Alliance (MSI – AN). While the MSI 
recognised at the early stages of integration that membership was a solid insurance policy 
for the country against the risk of sliding ‘eastward’, it has never been an enthusiastic 
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supporter. Reasons for this are found in the party’s belief in national autonomy and 
independent decision-making. Like many other conservative parties across Europe, the 
MSI-AN saw increasing EU legislative and regulatory powers as a dangerous threat to 
national independence. While recognising the importance of co-operation in a new 
globalised world, the heir of the MSI has not dramatically changed its position and 
remains moderate in its enthusiasm for increased integration.  
Considering that the Northern League (LN) is a right-wing regionalist party, it is 
striking how it differs from the consistency of MSI-AN. A significant trait of the LN since 
its inception was its positive attitude towards the Community (Cavatorta, 2001). The 
reason for such an enthusiastic support was based on the LN leadership’s view of the 
necessity to strengthen a supranational entity in order to weaken the central government 
and increase regional power vis-à-vis increased Brussels led delegation of power to the 
regions. LN also supported a drastic change in economic policies and emphasised the need 
for neo-liberal reforms to favour small and medium enterprises in the North. Given this 
strong support for Europe, the U-Turn from Europe in 1998 was a surprise (Iltanen, 
Kritzinger and Chari, 2004). The leadership outlined the reasons for the dramatic shift in 
attitude, stressing the overbearing bureaucracy, senseless regulations, and the loss of 
cultural identity to a disliked ‘European’ one tainted with multicultural tones.  
 Finally, the attitudes of Forza Italia (FI) are of significance. As the once Euro-
positive LN, FI was strongly pro-European, specifically focussing on Euro entry. 
However, this enthusiasm recently diminished because the party has become more 
traditional, rather than a movement with a charismatic leader (Pasquino, 2001). There is in 
fact a faction within FI that does not share the strong positive attitude initially outlined by 
Berlusconi. This faction, led by Finance Minister Tremonti, is sceptical of the integration 
process and advocates more autonomy in foreign, economic and social policy-making. 
The rift within the party over Europe, accompanied by the LN criticism of the EU, was 
manifest in the resignation in 2001 of the strongly pro-European Foreign Minister 
Ruggiero.   
In conclusion, the notion of Italy and Italians being very much supportive of the 
EU and integration process is subject to some qualifications. It has not always been true 
that all political movements had a favourable perception of Europe. Today, as in the past, 
political parties are not necessarily unanimous in their enthusiasm for the EU and its 
policies. Our following empirical analysis will capture these stances and the changes 
occurring over time.   
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Empirical Framework 
Method 
In order to better understand the Europeanisation process of Italian political 
parties, we use a new technique recently developed: the Laver-Benoit-Garry (2003) 
‘Wordscore’-programme for coding party manifestos. Its strength is its ‘objectivity.’ In 
fact, the technique does not depend on human coders and therefore eliminates potential 
subjective interpretations. This allows researchers to draw conclusions on the 
Europeanisation of parties from official documents and not from vague policy declarations 
or pre-conceived ideological positions. In applying this technique to this project, we also 
hope to contribute to its improvement, thereby increasing its scientific validity.  
Problems associated with previously employed methodologies are two-fold. First, 
there is the practical problem of current text analysis being very resource intensive, 
involving large amounts of skilled labour. These techniques are conventionally 
summarized as ‘hand coding’ techniques (also for computerized coding schemes) using 
traditional methods of content analysis. Within the Comparative Manifestos Projects this 
technique was applied to code party manifestos. The second main methodological problem 
derived from the first are the potential bias and the mistakes of human coders. The novelty 
with the Laver-Benoit-Garry approach is that texts are not treated as discourses “but as 
collections of word data containing information about the position of the texts’ authors on 
predefined policy dimensions” (Laver et al., 2003: 312). In other words, this technique 
counts word frequencies of texts about which something is known. Thereafter, this 
information allows to make assumptions about texts for which nothing is known. Hence, 
prior information is used to make estimations on the policy position of a consequent text. 
This is a novel approach that does not rely on personal coding schemes, as it was the case 
in the ‘Comparative Manifestos Project’ (Gabel and Huber, 2000; Laver and Budge, 
1992), resulting in more objective coding and less value-laden results.  
Of course, this technique does not allow one to make a purely inductive analysis of 
party manifesto policy positions. It works on a few previously established assumptions 
about the dimensionality and the meaning of the underlying policy dimensions. In more 
detail, unknown positions (‘virgin texts’) are estimated on known scales (‘reference texts’) 
and more objectivity can be approximated (Laver et al., 2003). New texts are compared 
with reference texts of which we know the policy positions. Reference texts can be 
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regarded as a basis that provides assumptions about the policy positions of future party 
manifestos. Based on this knowledge we can estimate the likelihood of finding a particular 
word in a particular references text. That is, a particular “score” is given for each word, 
which allows us to give any text a certain policy position and to place virgin texts on 
policy dimensions (Laver et al., 2003: 313). Hence, scores do not have any subjective 
interpretation but are treated exclusively as data. Each ‘score’ extends the information on 
the policy dimension of a particular text leading to reliable estimations of parties’ policy 
positions. 
The advantages of this method can be summarized as follows: “Because this 
technique treats word unequivocally as data, our technique not only allows us to estimate 
policy positions from political texts written in any language but, uniquely among the 
methods currently available, it allows us to calculate confidence intervals around these 
point estimates” (Laver et al., 2003: 312). This technique will therefore permit analysis of 
substantive differences between texts, transcending previous concerns of potential 
measurement errors due to different sources such as ‘hand-coding’.  
Based on this technique this project measures differences in salience degrees and 
in party positions regarding the EU. Furthermore, this technique gives the necessary 
information to draw conclusions on the direction of policy dimensions. For example, we 
will be in a better position to answer questions regarding changes or stability in policy 
positions towards the EU. 
In order to employ the technique, we use as reference texts the Euro-manifesto and 
also a national manifesto from one election to estimate the positions in the party 
manifestos in the following elections. We use then a priori positions of references texts on 
party’s European dimension assuming that these are valid references at point t allowing us 
to draw conclusions on party manifestos at point t+1 (Laver et al., 2003: 314). The 
context of point t is used to estimate the context of t+1. The a priori policy positions are 
taken from expert surveys carried out by Ray Leonard (1999). The expert surveys include 
evaluations of party positions towards integration for the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 
along a seven-point scale from ‘strongly opposed to European integration’ to ‘strongly in 
favour of European integration’ (party position objective), and evaluations of salience 
degrees along a five-point scale from ‘no importance’ to ‘most important issue’ (Ray, 
1999). In 1984 experts were asked to evaluate parties’ positions towards the status quo of 
the EC and the proposal to add a security aspect to the EC’s competencies. In 1988, 
parties’ positions considering the Single European Act were of interest, while in 1992 the 
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positions on the Maastricht Treaty were evaluated. Finally, the 1996 positions focused on 
the EMU and future political integration steps. The reliability of these expert surveys is 
slightly lower for the early years, but analysis of standard deviations demonstrates its 
comparability to the estimates of former expert surveys. Validity is also given as principal 
component factor analysis carried out over the expert surveys, the Comparative Party 
Manifesto data and the Eurobarometer-survey from 1988 indicates (Ray, 1999).  
 
Research design 
The research deals with two types of official party documents. First, it analyses the 
Euro-manifestos published by a range of Italian parties2 for each EP election since 1979. 
Secondly, it examines the manifestos published for the Italian parliamentary elections 
from 1976 onwards. Through analysis of the manifestos evidence demonstrating either 
increasing importance of European issues for political parties, or not, can be gathered. 
Manifestos allow for derivation of the position political parties have taken on EU issues at 
different conjunctures. Thus, through the analysis of a form of political competition we 
seek to explain a possible Europeanisation of political parties in Europe. 
Manifesto-texts are quite difficult to obtain from parties. Consequently, we were 
not able to receive the national manifestos for MSI and PCI in 1979, for RC in 1994, and 
for PDS in 1996.3 Regarding the Euro-manifestos, we were unable to collect the 
documents from both the MSI and the PCI for the 1979, 1984 and 1989 elections.4 
However, it is significant to note that at times parties did not publish manifestos for EP-
elections. For our analysis’ purposes, the absence of these documents does not pose a 
major problem for ‘Wordscore’. We decided to omit the national elections of 1979 and the 
EP-elections of the 1980s for both the MSI and PCI in order to produce consistent 
estimators.5  
To perform our research objectives we analyse Euro-manifestos and national 
manifestos in two stages. First, we analyse whether the word frequency related to the EU, 
such as ‘Europe’, ‘European Parliament’, ‘European Commission’, and ‘Single Market’, 
has increased and can be pinpointed. Using the context of the EU increasingly and with 
higher density provides a first impression of how parties use the European context. At this 
stage, we also analyse the degree of importance a political party assigns to the EU, and 
whether change can be observed. Increased importance would indicate ‘Europeanisation’ 
in terms of salience. Table 1 indicates the importance that parties attribute to European 
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integration according to experts’ views (a priori positions). In general, experts rate the 
importance political parties give to European issues as average. On the one hand parties do 
not regard the EU as absolutely unimportant, but, on the other hand, parties do not place it 
as their top priority. It is rated as those myriad of issues that parties deal with, albeit only 
generally. 
 
-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
In a second stage, we seek to explain the positions single parties have adopted 
towards European integration and whether or not these positions have changed over time. 
The expert survey estimations in Table 2 provide the a priori party position along the 
European dimension for each year. These two tables should be kept in mind, as references 
will be made when analysing the results.  
 
-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
On the basis of experts’ estimates, we can analyse whether changes in salience 
degrees and party positions have occurred applying them to our reference texts, the 
manifestos. For the analysis of national manifestos we start with the 1984 a priori 
positions applying them to the national manifestos of 1983.6 Based on these scores we 
calculate party politics’ developments and thus use the other expert survey estimates only 
as control scores. Regarding the Euro-manifestos, we start our analysis in 1994 due to the 
data problem faced, using both 1992 and 1996 estimations. Hence, in the next section we 
analyse European party positions in manifestos based on the dimensions of expert surveys.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Importance of Europe for Political Parties 
 Have political parties used the European context more frequently in recent years 
compared to when EP elections first occurred in 1979? Table 3 provides an initial 
impression of how political parties use European issues. Results illustrate the percentage 
of words, related to European integration,7 that political parties have used in their 
manifestos. 
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-- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
 The results indicate that parties differentiate between European and national 
elections. While in national manifestos European issues are hardly considered, European 
manifestos are more focused on the election topic. This indicates that political parties do 
not consider European issues important for national election success. European topics are 
far from being a priority; however, EP-elections are connected with European issues and 
one can observe that political parties subsequently focus more on the topic at hand.  
 Another relevant finding is that we cannot observe a change in word-frequencies 
over the years pertaining to national elections. There is a slight increase in the national 
election of 1994, but this trend cannot be observed for the following election in 1996. 
With the exception of LN, a decrease is noticed. Interestingly, FI did not mention 
European topics at all. The 1996 contest seems to have been focused almost entirely on 
domestic issues.  
 European elections offer a similar picture. In the 1994 elections all parties 
dedicated virtually the same percentage of words to European integration. Particularly, the 
centre-right parties dedicated considerable space to the European level. In the 1999 
elections this changes: parties differ among each other, with the PPI focussing more than 
twice as much words on European integration than RC, whereas FI and AN witnessed a 
concomitant fall in word frequencies.  
 We now consider comparison of these results with scores on the degree of 
importance parties assigned to European issues. The average importance as indicated in 
expert estimations in Table 1 does not seems to have changed. Table 4 illustrates the 
results for the Euro-manifestos and indicates that importance scores have changed slightly. 
But, this does not change the overall, average importance parties allocate to the European 
issues. Moreover, there is no consistent picture for all parties: while importance slightly 
increases for RC, PPI, FI and AN, scores for LN and PDS decrease. Hence, 
Europeanisation of political parties in terms of salience cannot be observed. The scores for 
the DC in the 1980s confirm the average importance parties assign to Europe. 8 
 
-- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
 Do importance scores differ in national manifestos? Table 5 shows that national 
manifestos do not indicate a change in EU-importance: only slight changes can be 
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observed since the 1970s and they do not modify the overall trend. Interestingly, however, 
importance scores are very similar to the ones for the Euro-manifestos. This validates our 
chosen method: regardless of Euro- or national manifestos, ‘Wordscore’ captures the 
overall importance a party associates to a certain political issue and it is not sensitive to 
the amount of words a party dedicates to the EU in national and in Euro-manifestos.  
 
-- TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
  
In conclusion, our results do not indicate a Europeanization in terms of salience of 
political parties over the last 20 years. Parties dedicated only limited space in their 
manifestos to European issues and, more importantly, they do not attribute more 
importance to the European integration process in 1999 than they did in 1976. National 
and Euro-manifestos still remain a forum where stances on Europe are of secondary 
importance and hence, EP-elections can still be considered as second-order elections. This 
suggests that national issues and national concerns are of major importance. It also means 
that national political parties have yet to recognize the importance of the EU, having 
weakly responded with the necessary ‘saliency’ regarding the impact of the integration 
process. 
 
Party Positions towards Europe 
 Having observed that Europeanization of political parties in terms of salience did 
not take place in Italy, we turn to analysis of party positions towards the EU. As 
previously mentioned, radical and also not so-radical changes in positions indicate that 
parties consider the new European level of governance and recognize the need establish a 
posture towards it. As the European dimension is new, parties might not have fixed 
positions and may still need to find suitable ones. Thus, changes express parties’ 
‘dedication’ to this new dimension and its efforts to ideologically absorb it. It follows that 
parties do not perceive the European integration process as self-evident, but are aware of 
the impact of integration on the national-level and the party itself. Changes in party 
positions are a sign that the European topic is present and parties address ‘new voters’ 
through positional modifications. Only topics that are considered important will undergo 
changes and variations are indications that parties become aware of this new dimension 
and try to adapt towards it in order to be competitive. In other words: parties shape their 
attitudes towards Europe based on the Europeanization process.  
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What changes in parties’ positions are observed? Based on Euro-manifestos, Table 
6 shows changes for almost every party. Parties have become more pro-European since 
EP-elections of 1994. Even parties that were quite anti-European moved towards the 
middle ground (value 3).   
 
-- TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
 The most interesting results feature FI and PDS. In 1999 FI is much more pro-
European (4.81) than experts have estimated (4.00, see Table 2), while the PDS is 
considerably less pro-European (4.24) than assumed (6.50, see Table 2). Rather, the PDS 
has almost the same position than FI. This might be due to the fact that the PDS was the 
largest party within the Olive Tree coalition government and therefore focused more 
strongly on national rather than European issues. However, it is interesting to note that the 
two major Italian parties roughly show the same position on Europe, even though the 
general perception is that FI is closer to the anti-European camp, whereas PDS is closer to 
the pro-European one.  
AN delivers another interesting result: evaluated as a rather anti-European party, it 
changed its position from 1.88 (see Table 2) in 1994 to 3.17 in 1999. The explanation is 
found in its changes in the 1990s. After its change from MSI to AN in 1994, AN worked 
hard to abandon its ‘fascist’ legacy and reshape many of its policies in order to become a 
more respectable conservative movement. It is conceivable that one of the measures 
adopted was to become more pro-European with a view of being recognized as a 
democratic political actor by other European parties.  
 A validation of our method is certainly the result of the LN. As repeatedly stated in 
the literature (Gabel, 2000; Cavatorta, 2001; Iltanen, Kritzinger and Chari, 2004), the LN 
performed a U-turn away from Europe. Our result captures this U-turn very precisely: the 
LN dropped from 5.88 (see Table 2) to 3.76. This is almost the same level as AN and 
more anti-European than FI, its future coalition partners.  
The PPI and RC results did not yield any surprises. Both parties behaved as 
expected: the PPI being a very pro-European party and RC being more critical of the EU. 
This critical position is due to the perceived neo-liberal integration process the EU is 
pursuing to the detriment of social rights and the expansion of the Welfare state.  
 Are the same changes reflected in the national manifestos? Our analysis offers a 
slightly different picture, but this is explained through the almost exclusive manifesto’s 
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focus on national issues. Furthermore, there is a time lag to consider between the two 
analyses: Euro-manifesto scores capture developments in the late 1990s, whereas national 
manifestos deal with changes in the 1980s/early 1990s. Thus, later changes could not have 
been tracked by national manifestos. Finally, it should also be noted that for the first time 
since post-World War II, the 1994 elections saw the parties competing with a radically 
different electoral system. The resultant ‘coalition game’ had effects on parties’ positions 
on a number of issues. The results are interesting and somehow also surprising, as Table 7 
shows.  
 
-- TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
 Concerning the DC/PPI, results are as expected: it remains a very pro-European 
party throughout the years. However, a small decrease in 1994 and 1996 is noticed. 
Comparing these figures with those obtained for the Euro-manifestos, shows a 
development in the opposite direction. The explanation for this apparent contradiction is 
found both in the diverse focus of national manifestos and in the different political 
environment the party was operating into in the mid 1990s. The elections of 1994 and 
1996, a short time after the Tangentopoli-scandal, demanded a major re-positioning of the 
DC/PPI in the national political space. This included leaving European issues, perceived 
as being of little interest to the electorate, clearly on the side.  
 Results also confirm the pro-European position of FI. Although the score slightly 
declines in 1996, FI is clearly a pro-European Italian political actor contrary to many 
experts’ perceptions. Moreover, the results suggest that major political parties in Italy 
need to be pro-European in order to be successful, as most of their voters favour European 
integration (see different Eurobarometer-surveys). 
 The LN behaves exactly as we assumed: it is the most pro-European political party 
in Italy up to 1998 and confirms former research results. And scores for AN underline the 
trend observed in the Euro-manifestos: moving steadily away from anti-European 
positions towards more moderate ones. In 1992 we notice a move back to rather negative 
positions, which can however be explained through the major changes occurring on the 
national political stage and through the overall re-orientation of the political parties. This 
did not include any major re-positioning towards Europe. 
 The same argument holds for the PCI/PDS, which was generally pro-European 
save in 1994. Ideological and administrative confusion due to the changes the party had 
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gone through, as well as the focus on national policies and institutions, eclipsed the 
European level.  
 RC offers another interesting result. Contrary to our expectations, RC proves to be 
pro-European and this contradicts expert estimates. A possible explanation is found in the 
party’s documents: RC proves to be in favour of European integration per se while it is 
opposed to an integration based on neo-liberal economic criteria and to a union, which 
also incorporates military defence. RC, opposite to right-wing parties with anti-European 
positions, does not fear losing national sovereignty and autonomous nationally based 
decision-making. Rather, it favours unifying Europe in order to internationalise the 
solutions for problems affecting workers. To this end, RC clearly indicates that social 
policies should be regulated at the European level as for one country alone it would not be 
suitable to pursue such changes. Thus, RC might be labelled as anti-European, but only if 
one believes that European integration is a neo-liberal process.  
 So, can we observe a Europeanisation of parties based on the position changes 
towards Europe? Contrary to the results analysed in the section on importance, the figures 
in this section indicate that a Europeanisation process is occurring. Parties do indeed 
change their positions towards Europe. Thus, the topic ‘Europe’ becomes a dynamic 
dimension within political parties, one which parties try to position themselves, to 
distinguish themselves from other parties, and to attract other political actors and voters. 
Figures were very stable during the 1970s and 1980s and only in the 1990s the dynamic 
changed, indicating that in earlier years the European dimension was not sufficiently 
important to merit significant time and political ‘discourse’ or even to trigger the need to 
change its positions towards it. The 1990s altered this pattern. Given this, it seems that the 
permissive consensus that characterised the opinion of European citizens towards Europe 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1979) is also applicable to 
political parties. Much like citizens withdrew their permissive consensus in the 1990s, 
political parties did the same, becoming much more active actors and taking ideologically 
into account the European dimension.  
 
Conclusion 
  Europeanisation of political parties is an under-explored field in the 
Europeanisation debate and our study contributes to the visibility of such scholarly 
investigation. We have argued that Europeanisation of political parties can be understood 
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and examined in two ways: first, as an impact on the importance political parties assign to 
the European dimension (salience), and second, on the positions that parties take up 
towards European integration (content).  
 Our results indicate that the leading Italian political parties experience different 
impacts. Europeanisation in terms of increase in importance (salience) could not be 
observed. Europe is ranked of average importance and has not experienced radical change 
over the years. However, Europeanisation in terms of influence on positions has taken 
place in the 1990s, leading one to conclude that political parties have extended the 
boundaries of relevant space. Parties attempt to find their positions within the European 
space and therefore ‘Europe’ helps to shape their attitudes.  
Hence, we observe only a partial Europeanisation process of political parties, 
where the content becomes slowly Europeanised and the permissive consensus of national 
political parties comes to an end, but where major European salience is not yet developed 
within national political parties. This leads us further to conclude that EP-elections still 
remain in the shadow of national issues and that European issues do not become salient 
during national elections. In order to overcome this problem, which also leads to the 
allegation of a democratic deficit in EP-elections, it is necessary that parties pay more 
attention to the European dimension and thus increase their salience towards Europe. Only 
then, the Europeanisation process of political parties will be complete.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 We are only interested in analysing whether political parties have changed their attitudes towards EP-
elections and do not implement public opinion in our analysis.  
2
 The parties are: DC/PPI, PCI/PDS, RC, LN, FI, MSI/AN. 
3
 Dr. Paul Pennings, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Comparative Electronic Manifestos Project, in 
cooperation with Science Center Berlin, Research Unit Institutions and Social change (A. Volkens; H.-D. 
Klingemann), the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Universität zu Köln (E. Mochmann) and 
the Manifesto Research Group (Chairman I. Budge), website: http://home.scw.vu.nl/~pennings/ECPR.htm, 
made available most of the national manifestos. 
4
 The Euro-manifesto research group at the University of Mannheim made available all analysed Euro-
manifestos. 
5
 The research institution Circap at the University of Siena assisted in completing the manifesto collection. 
6
 For the LN we will introduce the experts’ estimation in the1994 analysis. As we do not have any estimation 
for FI for 1994, we will calculate it based on the scores of the other parties.  
7
 The list of words that have been counted through Linux are available from the authors on requests. 
8
 A priori positions are taken from 1984. 
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Table 1: Expert survey estimates on parties’ importance of European Integration 
 Importance of issue 
 1984 1988 1992 1996 
Christian Democrats – Popular 
Party (DC/PPI) a 
3.75 3.75 3.75 3.63 
Forza Italia (FI) b -- -- -- 2.38 
Northern League (LN) c  2.80 3.00 3.14 
Italian Social Movement – 
National Alliance (MSI/AN) d 
2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 
Italian Communist Party – 
Democratic Party of the Left 
(PCI/PDS) e 
3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 
Refounded Communists (RC) f -- -- 2.43 2.43 
Notes: Values are means of experts’ estimations on a 5 point scale from ‘European Integration is of no 
importance’ to ‘European Integration is the most important issue for the party’. 
a
 The Christian Democrats changed their name into Peoples Party in 1993 after the corruption scandal ‘mani 
pulite’ 
b
 Forza Italia ran for elections in 1994 for the first time. 
c
 The Northern League did not yet exist in 1984 
d
 The Italian Social Movement changed its name into National Alliance for the 1994 elections. 
e
 The Italian Communist Party changed into Democratic Party of the Left after the collapse of communist 
regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. 
f
 The Refounded Communists are a splinter of the Italian Communist Party, which did not want to change 
into the Democratic Party of the Left. 
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Table 2: Expert survey estimates on parties’ position on European Integration 
 
Position on European Integration 
 
1984 1988 1992 1996 
DC/PPI 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.38 
FI 
   4.00 
LN 
 5.80 5.88 6.00 
MSI/AN 1.63 1.63 1.88 2.25 
PCI/PDS 5.80 6.00 6.25 6.50 
RF 
  2.43 2.14 
Notes: Values are means of experts’ estimations on a 7 point scale from ‘Strongly opposed to European 
Integration’ to ‘Strongly in favour of European Integration’. 
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Table 3: Frequencies of Words related to the European integration process in National 
and European Manifestos (in percentage)  
% 1976 1979 1983/84 1987/89 1992 1994 1996/99 
Parties NP NP EP NP EP NP EP NP NP EP NP EP 
 
            
DC/PPI 0,479 0,483 0,479 0,251 3,253 0,366 3,376 0,633 0,806 2,589 0,532 4,279 
MSI/AN 0,139 -- -- 0,312 -- 0,257 -- 0,004 0,605 3,712 0,413 2,485 
PCI/PDS 0,282 -- 2,146 0,401 -- 0,233 -- 0,149 0,578 3,054 -- 3,400 
LN -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0,314 3,334 0,753 3,527 
FI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0,506 3,638 0 2,754 
RC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,528 -- 1,671 
Notes: NP = National Manifestos; EP = European Manifestos 
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Table 4: Parties’ importance scores on European Integration based on 1992 and 1996 
expert survey estimates (EP-elections) 
Party Importance Estimates 
       
 FI94 FI99 RC99 PPI99 PDS99 LN99 AN99 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores 
bases on 1992 expert surveys 2.93 3.27 2.60 3.84 2.75 2.77 2.79 
SE 0.108 0.095 0.031 0.138 0.068 0.038 0.067 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores 
bases on 1996 expert surveys 2.92 3.22 2.61 3.80 2.80 2.82 2.81 
SE 0.107 0.095 0.032 0.134 0.069 0.038 0.067 
Party Importance Estimates for DC in 1980s 
 
 PCI80s DC1984 DC1988 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores  -- 3.03 3.78 
SE 
 0.168 0.010 
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Table 5: Parties’ importance scores on European Integration based on 1983 expert survey 
estimates (national elections) 
 
Importance of European Integration Issues 
 1983 (E.S.) 1976  1987  1992 1994 1996 
DC/PPI 
  
3.75 3.57 
(S.E. 0.034) 
% 88.8 
3.49 
(S.E. 0.021) 
% 87.4 
3.75 
(S.E. 0.025) 
% 87.8 
3.43 
(S.E. 0.064) 
% 87.8 
3.65 
(S.E. 0.115) 
% 92.3 
FI -- -- -- -- 2.97 
(S.E. 0.046) 
% 90.0 
2.95 
(S.E. 0.148) 
% 91.0 
LN -- -- -- -- 3.00 (E.S.) 2.87 
(S.E. 0.032) 
% 91.2 
MSI/AN 2.63 2.47 
(S.E. 0.068) 
% 86.4 
2.45 
(S.E. 0.111) 
% 85.0 
2.67 
(S.E. 0.145) 
% 87.5 
2.46 
(S.E. 0.058) 
% 86.7 
2.74 
(S.E. 0.026) 
% 90.0 
PCI/PDS 3.00 3.27 
(S.E. 0.034) 
% 90.8 
3.39 
(S.E. 0.038) 
% 90.2 
2.89 
(S.E. 0.082) 
% 83.1 
3.46 
(S.E. 0.092) 
% 88.8 
-- 
RF -- -- -- -- -- (3.16) 
Notes: E.S. = Expert survey estimates; % words scored 
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Table 6: Parties’ Positions Scores on European Integration based on 1992 and 1996 
expert survey estimates (EP-elections) 
Party Position Estimates 
       
 FI94 FI99 RC99 PPI99 PDS99 LN99 AN99 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores 
bases on 1992 expert surveys 3.83 4.81 2.79 8.33 4.24 3.76 3.17 
SE 0.605 0.621 0.192 0.805 0.439 0.241 0.433 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores 
bases on 1996 expert surveys 3.94 5.14 2.72 8.42 4.24 3.87 3.33 
SE 0.611 0.605 0.194 0.782 0.440 0.240 0.423 
Party Position Estimates for DC in 1980s 
   
 PCI80s DC1984 DC1988 
Transformed Europe Policy text scores  -- 5.82 6.40 
SE 
 0.130 0.077 
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Table 7: Parties’ position scores European Integration based on 1983 expert survey 
estimates (national elections) 
 
Position on European Integration 
 
1983 (E.S.) 1976  1987  1992 1994 1996 
DC/PPI  6.38 6.04 
(S.E. 0.114) 
% 88.8 
5.79 
(S.E. 0.074) 
% 87.4 
7.37 
(S.E. 0.010) 
% 87.8 
5.60 
(S.E. 0.233) 
% 87.8 
5.12 
(S.E. 0.558) 
% 92.3 
FI -- -- -- -- 5.46 
(S.E. 0.226) 
% 90.0 
5.01 
(S.E. 0.739) 
% 91.0 
LN -- -- -- -- 5.88 (E.S.) 7.18 
(S.E. 0.163) 
% 91.2 
MSI/AN 1.63 1.45 
(S.E. 0.249) 
% 86.4 
1.47 
(S.E. 0.423) 
% 85.0 
2.62 
(S.E. 0.609) 
% 87.5 
1.55 
(S.E. 0.220) 
% 86.7 
2.44 
(S.E. 0.131 
% 90.0 
PCI/PDS 5.80 5.82 
(S.E. 0.119) 
% 90.8 
6.11 
(S.E. 0.132) 
% 90.2 
3.21 
(S.E. 0.344) 
% 83.1 
6.37 
(S.E. 0.335) 
% 88.8 
-- 
RF -- -- -- -- -- (5.38) 
(S.E. 0.382) 
% 91.5 
Notes: E.S. = Expert survey estimates; % words scored 
 
